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Abstract 
The problem of allocating indivisible goods is considered when groups of individuals can make use of 
their power to plunder other groups. A monarch in a group of individuals is an individual who always 
obtains one of his most preferred goods. A Paretian condition together with a requirement of robust 
stability lead to the existence of monarchs in all subsets of individuals, except possibly one. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The typical economic model presumes that the activities carried out by the agents of the 
model are voluntary, in the sense that the will of the individuals is not forced. This 
approach neglecting the role of power in the allocation of resources contrasts with the 
pervasiveness of transactions governed by coercion, even in the presence of institutions 
entrusted to prevent, prosecute and punish the use of coercion. 
 
A recent exception is Piccione and Rubinstein (2007), who study the existence and 
efficiency of the general equilibrium of an exchange economy with divisible goods in 
which power dictates who gets what. This paper also suggests a model of involuntary 
exchange. There are two differences with respect to the model analyzed by Piccione and 
Rubinstein. On the one hand, goods are indivisible. And, on the other, it is not only 
individuals that may exercise coercion, but also groups of individuals.  
 
Specifically, the allocation model of indivisible goods by Shapley and Scarf (1974) is 
adopted, with the only difference that property rights are not defined. Since only power 
can guarantee that property rights will be respected, it seems more appropriate to 
consider such rights an output of the allocation process rather than an input. In addition, 
a number is supposed to measure the power of any coalition of individuals. An 
allocation α is stable with respect to that measure of power, the preferences of the 
individuals, and a certain coalition structure if no allocation β, no coalition K, and no 
group G ∪ J of individuals exist, with G consisting of members of K and J consisting of 
individuals not in K, such that: (i) the group G ∪ J has more power than the residual 
coalition K\G; (ii) the set of goods that the members of K ∪ J receive in β coincides 
with the set of goods that they receive in α, so the members of G ∪ J can distribute 
among themselves their own goods together with those from the members of K\G; and 
(iii) each member of G ∪ J prefers the good he receives in β to the one received in α. 
 
A society is a set of individuals. A monarch in society I is an individual who, for every 
allocation problem involving I, always receives one of his most preferred goods. It is 
shown that every society has a monarch if the allocation must be Paretian and stable 
with respect to at least two coalition structures different from the trivial coalition 
structure, the one in which all the individuals belong to the same coalition. This result 
requires that the maximum number of individuals n in an allocation problem and the 
maximum number m of goods to be allocated in an allocation problem satisfy m + 1 ≥ n 
≥ 3, so monarchs need abundance, and enough people, to arise. 
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2. Definitions and assumptions 
 
The finite set N = {1, … , n}, consisting of the first n ≥ 1 positive integers, is a set of 
names for individuals. A society is a non-empty subset of N. The finite set X contains m 
≥ 1 elements representing objects or anything that can be assigned to the individuals 
(like social status or public offices). The null object is represented by 0 ∉ X. For non-
empty Y ⊆ X, TY is the set of preferences on Y, defined to be the set of reflexive, 
complete and transitive binary relations that can be defined on Y ∪ {0} such that every 
x ∈ Y is strictly preferred to 0. For non-empty Y ⊆ X, LY is the set of strict preferences 
on Y ⊆ X, that is, the set of preferences on Y in which the underlying binary relation is 
antisymmetric. For society I and non-empty Y ⊆ X, a preference profile based on I and Y 
is a function PIY : I → TY. The set D is the set of all functions PIY : I → TY, where I ⊆ N 
and Y ⊆ X. 
 
Let I ⊆ N and Y ⊆ X be non-empty. If Y has as many members as I, then an allocation 
based on I and Y is an injective mapping αIY : I → Y. If Y has less members than I, then 
an allocation based on I and Y is a mapping αIY : I → Y ∪ {0} such that, for some J ⊂ I 
having the same number of members as Y: (i) for all i ∈ I\J, αIY(i) = 0; and (ii) for some 
allocation αJY based on J and Y, αIY(i) = αJY(i) for all i ∈ J. If αIY(i) = 0, i is assigned no 
object. If αIY(i) ≠ 0, αIY(i) is the member of Y that is assigned to individual i ∈ I. The set 
A is the set of all allocations based on I and Y, where I ⊆ N and Y ⊆ X. 
 
Definition 2.1. An allocation rule on non-empty E ⊆ D is a mapping f : E → A. 
 
An allocation rule is a mapping f that transforms each profile PIY from a subset E of the 
set D of all preference profiles into an allocation f(PIY) based on I and Y. If i ∈ I is 
assigned some object in f(PIY), then fi(PIY) designates that object.  
 
Definition 2.2. For allocation rule f : E → A, individual i ∈ I is a monarch in society I 
if, for all PIY ∈ E, no member of Y is strictly preferred to fi(PIY) in PIY(i). 
 
Definition 2.3. Allocation rule f : E → A is: (i) monarchical if there is a list (i1, … , in) 
of the n members of N such that, for each society I, the member of I appearing first in 
the list (i1, … , in) is a monarch in I; and (ii) essentially monarchical if it is monarchical 
except, possibly, for society {in−1, in}, that may not have a monarch. 
 
Definition 2.4. Allocation rule f : E → A is weakly Paretian if, for all PIY ∈ E and i ∈ I, 
there is no x ∈ {y ∈ Y: for all j ∈ I, fj(PIY) ≠ y} such that i prefers x to fi(PIY) in PIY(i). 
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Definition 2.5. A power function is a mapping w : 2N\{∅} → ℕ\{0} satisfying, for each 
S ∈ 2N\{∅} and each i ∈ N\S, w(S ∪ {i}) > w(S). 
 
A power function assigns, to each non-empty group S of individuals, a positive integer 
w(S) that measures the power of S. The definition of power function presumes that the 
addition of an individual to any group of individuals increases the power of the group. 
If, for some i ∈ N, S = {i}, then w(i) abbreviates w({i}). 
 
Definition 2.6. For society I, a coalition structure C on I is a set {I1, … , Ik} such that: 
(i) for all r ∈ {1, … , k}, Ir ≠ ∅; (ii) for all r ∈ {1, … , k} and t ∈ {1, … , k}\{r}, Ir ∩ It 
= ∅; and (iii) I = I1 ∪ … ∪ Ik. 
 
A coalition structure on a society I is just a partition of I. A coalition structure is non-
trivial if it contains at least two members.  
 
Definition 2.7. An allocation αIY based on I and Y is stable with respect to power 
function w, coalition structure C on I and preference profile PIY based on I and Y if there 
do not exist K ∈ C, non-empty G ⊂ K, J ⊆ I\K (where J can be the empty set), and 
allocation βIY based on I and Y such that: 
(i) w(G ∪ J) > w(K\G); 
(ii) for all i ∈ G ∪ J, βIY(i) is strictly preferred to αIY(i) in PIY(i); and 
(iii) for all i ∈ I\(K ∪ G), βIY(i) = αIY(i). 
 
An allocation αIY is stable with respect to power function w, coalition structure C and 
preference profile PIY if no coalition K in the structure C can be plundered. This means 
that no subset G of K can join forces with members J outside K to create a coalition G ∪ 
J having more power, according to w, than the residual coalition K\G and use that power 
to reallocate the objects that αIY assigns to the members of K ∪ J in such a way that all 
the members of G ∪ J are better off, according to the preferences in PIY.  
 
Definition 2.8. An allocation αIY based on I and Y, with I having at least three members, 
is minimally robust with respect to power function w, family FI of coalition structures 
on I and preference profile PIY based on I and Y if there are at least two non-trivial 
coalition structures C' and C'' in FI such that, for all C ∈ {C', C''}, αIY is stable with 
respect to w, C and PIY. 
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Definition 2.9. Allocation rule f : E → A is minimally robust if there is a power function 
w satisfying the following: for each PIY ∈ E, there is a family FI of coalition structures 
on I such that (i) if I has at least three members, then f(PIY) is minimally robust with 
respect to w, FI, and PIY, and (ii) if I has two members, then, for some C ∈ FI, f(PIY) is 
stable with respect to w, C, and PIY.  
 
When power mediates allocation, it is to be expected that coalitions of two types will be 
formed. There will be, on the one hand, defensive coalitions, established to prevent 
other coalitions from snatching what the members of the defensive coalition possess. 
But, on the other hand, there will be aggressive coalitions, constituted precisely to 
snatch what other coalitions have. The interplay between these two kinds of coalitions 
would probably reach a steady state, in which defensive coalitions are too powerful to 
be plundered or in which aggressive coalitions have achieved their goals. Both 
situations are characterized by the fact that there is no need or possibility to exercise 
power. An allocation rule is intended to capture such resting points. A minimally robust 
allocation rule implicitly looks for power functions that can lead to an equilibrium in the 
use of power, asking for the existence of at least two coalition non-trivial structures 
under which there is no need or opportunity to resort to power to alter the allocation. 
 
 
3. Result 
 
Proposition 3.1. With m ≥ n − 1 and n ≥ 3, let f : E → A be an allocation rule such that 
E ⊆ D and (1) holds. If f is weakly Paretian and minimally robust, then f is essentially 
monarchical. 
 
For each society I with at least two members, there are Y ⊆ X 
having one member less than I, PIY ∈ E, and p ∈ LY such that, 
for all i ∈ I, PIY(i) = p.       1) 
 
Proof. Let w be the power function under which f is minimally robust.  
 
Step 1: for every society I there is i ∈ I such that w(I\{i}) ≤ w(i). Let I have r members. 
The claim is obviously true for r = 1, so let r ≥ 2. By (1), there is Y = {x1, … , xr−1} ⊆ X 
and PIY ∈ E such that, for all i ∈ I and all k ∈ {1, … , r − 1}, xk is the kth most preferred 
object in PIY(i). Being f weakly Paretian, all objects in Y are assigned to some member 
of I. Hence, for some i ∈ I, fi(PIY) = x1. For k ∈ {2, … , r − 1}, let ik ∈ I be assigned xk 
in f(PIY). By minimal robustness, f(PIY) must be stable with respect to w, PIY and some 
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coalition structure C on I. Let βIY be the allocation such that, for all k ∈ {2, … , r}, β(ik) 
= xk−1. By the assumption that receiving an object is strictly preferred to receiving none, 
for all j ∈ I\{i}, βIY(j) PIY(j) fj(PIY). In view of this, by stability of f(PIY), w(I\{i}) ≤ w(i). 
 
Step 2: there is a list (i1, … , in) of the n members of N such that w(i1) > w(i2) > … > 
w(in−2) > w(in−1) ≥ w(in). Consider society N. By step 1, for some i1 ∈ N, w(i1) ≥ 
w(N\{i1}). By definition of power function, w(i1) ≥ w(N\{i1}) implies that, for all j ∈ 
N\{i1}, w(i1) > w(j). Arguing inductively, suppose that, for some k < n − 2, (i1, … , ik) 
are such that w(i1) > … > w(ik) and, for all j ∈ N\{i1, … , ik}, w(ik) > w(j). It must be 
shown that, for some ik+1 ∈ N\{i1, … , ik}, w(i1) > … > w(ik+1) and, for all j ∈ N\{i1, … , 
ik, ik+1}, w(ik+1) > w(j). By step 1, for some ik+1 ∈ N\{i1, … , ik}, w(ik+1) ≥ w(N\{i1, … , 
ik+1}). Since k < n − 2, the set N\{i1, … , ik+1} has at least two members. Hence, by 
definition of power function, w(ik+1) ≥ w(N\{i1, … , ik+1}) implies that, for all j ∈ N\{i1, 
… , ik+1}, w(ik+1) > w(j). This proves that members i1, … , in−2 of N can be found such 
that w(i1) > … > w(in−2) and both w(in−2) > w(in−1) and w(in−2) > w(in). As regards, in−1 
and in, it may be that w(in−1) = w(in).  
 
Step 3: f is essentially monarchical. By step 2, there is a list (i1, … , in) of the n members 
of N such that w(i1) > w(i2) > … > w(in−2) > w(in−1) ≥ w(in). Choose society I ≠ {in−1, in}. 
Let i be the member of I appearing first in the list (i1, … , in). It must be shown that i is a 
monarch in I. If I = {i}, then, since f is weakly Paretian, i is a monarch in I. If I has at 
least two members, then I ≠ {in−1, in} implies that i ∉ {in−1, in}. Case 1: I has two 
members. Let j be the other member of I. Given that i appears before j in (i1, … , in) and 
i ∉ {in−1, in}, w(i) > w(j). By minimal robustness, i must be a monarch in {i, j}. Case 2: I 
has more than two members. Suppose i is not a monarch in I. By step 1, there is j ∈ I 
such that w(j) ≥ w(I\{j}). By definition of power function, w(j) ≥ w(I\{j}) implies w(j) > 
w(i). This means that j ∈ I must appear before i in the list (i1, … , in): contradiction. 
 
Proposition 3.1 does not hold for m < n − 1. The reason is that step 1 need not be true, 
because it is possible to have, for all i ∈ I, w(I\{i}) > w(i) due to the lack of enough 
objects to improve the position of every individual in I\{i} when the members of I\{i} 
try to allocate the objects without taking into account i. This fact has an interesting 
interpretation: the concentration of allocation power in the hands of a monarch requires 
society to be endowed with a sufficiently high amount of wealth. In other words, 
scarcity is an antidote for monarchs. 
 
Proposition 3.1 can be easily transformed into a result establishing sufficient conditions 
for a monarchical allocation rule: just modify the definition of power function so that 
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there is some i ∈ N such that, for all j ∈ N\{i}, w(i) < w(j). This says that there exists a 
least powerful individual. This condition ensures that society {in−1, in} will also have a 
monarch. 
 
Proposition 3.1 does not restrict the way the objects left by the monarch i of society I 
(with at least three members) are allocated among the rest of individuals in I\{i}. In fact, 
the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 3.1 cannot be applied to the subsociety I\{i}, 
because i, being at least as powerful as the rest of the society, can essentially determine 
how the rest of objects are assigned. As an illustration, let I have r ≥ 4 members and i be 
the monarch in I. Choose any group J of I\{i} having r − 3 members. Then, with {j, k} 
⊆ I\{i}, the non-trivial coalition structures {J ∪ {i}, {j, k}} and {J ∪ {i}, {j}, {k}} can 
make any allocation among the members of J minimally robust. Consequently, the 
inclusion of the monarch in some coalition prevents the emergence of any hierarchical 
structure among the rest of individuals. That structure could be generated by imposing a 
non-bossiness condition. 
 
Non-bossiness, as defined in Svensson (1999) or Pápai (2000), is a condition expressed 
in terms of preferences: if, by changing his preferences, an individual induces a change 
in the allocation, then he must be affected by this allocation change. In the present 
model, non-bossiness would be a condition restricting the set of admissible coalition 
structures with respect to which stability is defined: admissible coalition structures 
should be such that individuals that are “too powerful” must constitute singleton 
coalitions. Such non-bossy coalition structures are motivated by a principle of non-
interference: individuals powerful enough to get what they want by themselves should 
refrain from meddling in the allocation of objects among non-powerful individuals. 
With minimal robustness defined in terms of non-bossy coalition structures, every 
society with r ≥ 3 individuals would allocate objects following a fixed hierarchy of r − 2 
individuals; see Ergin (2000) for another set of sufficient conditions for a partial 
hierarchy to emerge. By including the condition that some individual is the least 
powerful individual in the whole society N, a complete hierarchy would be present in 
every society. 
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